The Growing Influence of European Union Law by Eeckhout, Piet
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 33, Issue 5 2011 Article 6




Copyright c©2011 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj




This Essay discusses a number of themes which show the growing influence of European
Union (”EU”) law. Four themes were chosen to illustrate that influence. The themes are inter-
connected, and hopefully bringing them together allows the reader to get a sense of the unique
experiment which this “new legal order” continues to conduct. Part I examines the EU’s own
”federal question:” what exactly is the scope of EU law, and how is it determined? How does
the case law, in particular that of the EU’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”),
determine the boundaries of the EU law territory? These questions are examined in various parts
of EU law, including, for example, rights of free movement, residence, and non-discrimination
conferred on EU citizens. Part II then looks at the other side of the coin: the relationship between
EU law and international law. The focus of this section is the recent Kadi judgment concerning
counterterrorism. This judgment confirms the autonomy of EU law, even in the face of United Na-
tions (”U.N.”) Security Council resolutions and the absence of fundamental rights in the decision.
Part III concerns the relationship between economic freedoms and the protection of human rights.
This is an area in which the ECJ is able to make a specific contribution, as it is often confronted
with questions of how to balance free trade and free movement with human rights protection. Part








This Essay is based on a paper presented at a conference in 
London, organized jointly by the Centre of European Law of 
King’s College London and by the U.K. judiciary. The theme of 
the conference was “Legal Boundaries, Common Problems and 
the Role of the Supreme Court.” It brought together leading 
judges and academics from around the globe. Lord Slynn was 
President of the Centre of European Law for more than a 
decade, and sat on the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and 
the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom).1 He was, sadly, no longer around at the time of the 
conference, but he would surely have enjoyed its purpose and 
focus. This Essay—which focuses on the growing influence of 
European Union (“EU”) law and its relationship with other legal 
systems, both national and international—is dedicated to this 
eminent judge, who made such a tremendous contribution to 
legal dialogue and integration. 
This Essay discusses a number of themes which show the 
growing influence of EU law. The four themes were chosen to 
illustrate that influence, also for those less familiar with EU law. 
The themes are interconnected, and hopefully bringing them 
together allows the reader to get a sense of the unique 
experiment which this “new legal order” continues to conduct. 
Part I examines the EU’s own “federal question:” what 
exactly is the scope of EU law, and how is it determined? How 
does the case law, in particular that of the EU’s supreme court, 
the ECJ, determine the boundaries of the EU law territory? These 
questions are examined in one particular area of EU law, for 
 
*  Professor of European Law and Director Centre of European Law, King’s 
College London. I am very grateful for the research assistance by Ms. Sarah-Nada Arfa. 
1. See Lord Slynn of Hadley: Astute Counsel and Law Lord who Represented the Treasury 
as its ‘Devil’ Early in his Career and was the UK’s Advocate General at the European Court of 
Justice, TIMES (London), Apr. 9, 2009, at 67. 
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example, rights of free movement, residence, and non-
discrimination conferred on EU citizens. Part II then looks at the 
other side of the coin: the relationship between EU law and 
international law. The focus of this section is the recent Kadi 
judgment concerning counterterrorism. This judgment confirms 
the autonomy of EU law, even in the face of United Nations 
(“U.N.”) Security Council resolutions and the absence of 
fundamental rights in the decision. Part III concerns the 
relationship between economic freedoms and the protection of 
human rights. This is an area in which the ECJ is able to make a 
specific contribution, as it is often confronted with questions of 
how to balance free trade and free movement with human rights 
protection. Part IV focuses on the cardinal principle of EU law: 
its primacy over conflicting national law. 
I. EU LAW AND THE FEDERAL QUESTION 
The reach and scope of EU law keep expanding, in a 
process which has been called “competence creep.”2 This 
expansion is partly caused by the successive treaty amendments, 
the latest through the Treaty of Lisbon,3 which entered into force 
on December 1, 2009.4 No major new areas of EU action are 
opened up by that treaty. However, it will contribute to 
competence creep. The EU’s trade policy will be expanded to 
 
2. See Stephen R. Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence Control, 22 Y.B. OF 
EUR. L. 1, 5 (2004). 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1 [hereinafter Reform 
Treaty]. The Treaty of Lisbon partially renamed the founding European Union 
treaties—Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) and Treaty on 
the European Union (“TEU”)—and renumbered all of their provisions entirely. 
However, the text of the articles referred to in the published form of the treaties is 
largely left unchanged. See generally id. 
To avoid confusion, all references in this Essay to the EC Treaty and TEU use a 
parallel citation format and provide numbering both before and after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The EC Treaty was renamed the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). While the TEU has kept its original 
name, for the purpose of clarity this Essay will refer to the original version as “TEU pre-
Lisbon” and the updated version as “TEU post-Lisbon.” See generally Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 [hereinafter TEU post-
Lisbon]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5 
[hereinafter TEU pre-Lisbon]. The consolidated version of the treaties with the new 
numbering is available at http://eur lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm. The new, 
consolidated version of the treaties entered into force on December 1, 2009, and 
contains a table of equivalences between pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon numberings. 
4. Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 135. 
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include matters of foreign direct investment, thereby including 
international investment law.5 The EU’s criminal policies are 
moved from the third pillar (intergovernmental) to what is now 
the first. This means that there will be greater judicial 
involvement, the EU courts acquiring full jurisdiction in criminal 
matters. It may also lead to more EU legislation in this area. 
Earlier treaty amendments set in motion new policies that 
are gradually expanding. For judicial purposes, the most 
significant ones are those brought together under the heading 
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.”6 Those policies include 
criminal law cooperation, alluded to above, but also immigration 
and asylum, and so-called judicial cooperation in civil matters 
(mainly conflicts of law and jurisdictional matters).7 Also of great 
importance is the EU’s policy to fight discrimination. Originally 
limited to nationality and sex discrimination, EU legislation, 
called directives, adopted in 2000, extended antidiscrimination 
policy to cover race, sexual orientation, religion or belief, age, 
disability, and the like.8 The EU legislation establishes broad 
principles, casting the courts in a central role. As can be seen 
from this brief overview, the days that the EU courts dealt mainly 
with economic matters are long gone. 
These new policies considerably expand the EU’s federal 
territory. There is, however, more to the EU’s federal question. 
The nature of the relationship between EU law and the laws of 
the Member States keeps evolving, and some deeper questions 
are embedded in that relationship. Those questions are 
connected to determining the proper scope of EU law. To which 
persons and to what set of facts does EU law apply? This short 
Essay explores such questions by reference to case law in one 
particular, but important, area: EU citizenship. 
 
5. See Commission Press Release, Treaty of Lisbon Enters into Force—Implications 
for the EU’s Trade Policy (Dec. 1, 2009). 
6. See, e.g., Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2(63)–(64), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 57–59 
(stating the limits of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in the “area of freedom, 
security and justice”); see also Andrew Duff, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe, True Guide to the Treaty of Lisbon, at 9, Dec. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/files/Download/True-Guide-NEW.pdf. 
7. Reform Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2(67), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 63–67. 
8. See Council Directive Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation, No. 2000/78, 2000 O.J. L 303/16; Council Directive 
Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial 
or Ethnic Origin, No. 2000/43, 2000 O.J. L 180/22. 
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A. Defining EU Citizenship 
Citizenship of the EU was established by the Treaty on 
European Union, commonly called the Maastricht Treaty.9 
Citizenship is conferred on all nationals of the Member States.10 
From a judicial perspective, the most significant rights conferred 
on EU citizens are those to move and reside freely in any of the 
Member States.11 Whereas prior to Maastricht such rights of 
movement and residence were limited to the economically active, 
they can now be exercised by any national of a Member State, 
subject to mild conditions.12 The ECJ is developing a substantial 
body of case law about the scope of these rights of free 
movement and residence, and seems intent on putting them at 
the center of the EU law experiment. Indeed, it consistently calls 
EU citizenship the “fundamental status” of the nationals of the 
Member States.13 Let us look at some examples of case law in 
which the court pushes these rights to their boundaries. 
In earlier case law on EU citizenship, the court often applied 
article 18 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(“EC Treaty” or “EC”) (article 21 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”))14 together with 
article 12 EC (article 18 TFEU), which prohibits any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality “within the scope of this 
Treaty.”15 Citizens exercising their rights of free movement were 
entitled not to be discriminated against on grounds of their 
nationality. However, for such discrimination to be caught by 
article 18 EC in conjunction with article 12 EC, it had to be 
within the scope of the treaty. The court has stated that this 
 
9. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1. 
10. Id. art. G(C), 1992 O.J. C 191, at 7. 
11. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 57 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 17–18 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
12. See Council Directive on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family 
Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, No. 
2004/38, art. 7, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, at 93 (referring to the need to have sufficient 
resources as well as sickness insurance). 
13. See, e.g., Grzelczyk v. Centre Public (Belg.), Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-
6193, ¶ 31. 
14. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 45. 
15. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 18, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 15. 
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involved both a personal and a material element.16 The personal 
scope was limited to nationals of the Member States. But cases 
also needed to come within the scope of EU law in a material 
sense, because it concerned certain benefits covered by EU 
legislation.17 Moreover, some form of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality had to be demonstrated.18 These various elements 
limited the scope of article 18 EC.19 
In more recent case law, by contrast, the court is happy to 
apply article 18 EC on its own. It continues to speak about the 
personal and material scope of this provision. However, the latter 
aspect is subsumed in an analysis of the effect of a particular 
national measure on the exercise of free movement rights. It is 
sufficient that such a measure may have some detrimental effect 
for the “moving” EU citizen, for article 18 EC to apply. No 
further link with EU law is required. The best examples of this 
effective expansion of article 18 EC are probably the cases on 
benefits for civilian war victims. Tas-Hagen & Tas concerned 
Dutch nationals who were recognized in the Netherlands as 
civilian war victims of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East 
Indies (now Indonesia) during World War II.20 This status 
entitled them to benefit payments, if since 1987 they were living 
in the Netherlands.21 The Dutch legislation required the 
beneficiaries to reside in the Netherlands.22 In reply to the 
question of whether this legislation came within the material 
scope of EU law, the court recognized that these kinds of war 
benefits are within the competence of the Member States;23 there 
is no EU legislation in the matter. Nevertheless, the Member 
States had to respect article 18 EC,24 and this provision was 
applicable simply because Tas-Hagen and Tas had moved to 
 
16. See, e.g., Sala v. Bayern, Case C-85/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-2691, ¶ 28. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. ¶ 64. 
19. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48 (prohibiting 
discrimination based on nationality and permitting the Council to adopt rules 
proscribing discrimination). 
20. Tas-Hagen v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen-en Uitkeringsraad, Case C-
192/05, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451. 
21. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. 
22. Id. ¶ 5. 
23. Id. ¶ 21. 
24. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 45. 
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Spain.25 The court then stated that “[n]ational legislation which 
places at a disadvantage certain of the nationals of the Member 
State concerned simply because they have exercised their 
freedom to move and to reside in another Member State is a 
restriction on the freedoms conferred by Article 18(1) EC on 
every citizen of the Union.”26 That was the case here: the 
residence condition was liable to dissuade Netherlands nationals 
who are civilian war victims from exercising their free movement 
rights.27  
These judgments establish a broad principle, which 
considerably expands the scope of EU law. National measures 
which hamper free movement or place moving EU citizens at a 
disadvantage are caught by article 18 EC and no further 
connection with EU law is required.28 On a continent where 
people increasingly move around, the principle is likely to 
become ever more significant. Fundamentally, it raises the 
question of how territorially-based national legislation interacts 
with globalization. Indeed, the basic issue in many of the free 
movement cases is whether a condition of residence can be 
imposed for the award of a social security or other benefit, 
scholarship, student loan, tax advantage, etc. What connection 
with a particular country is required, and when is such a 
requirement justified? 
B. The Role of “Purely Internal Situations” 
This case law on EU citizenship also puts pressure on what 
could be called a counter-federal principle of EU law: the 
principle that “purely internal situations” are not caught by EU 
free movement law. Such situations concern facts and issues 
confined to a particular Member State. A recent case which 
exemplifies the strain on this principle is the Flemish Care 
 
25. Tas-Hagen, [2006] E.C.R. I-10,451, ¶¶ 25–26. 
26. Id. ¶ 31. 
27. See Nerkowska v. Zakład, Case C-499/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, ¶ 33. Other cases 
exemplifying that a mere effect on rights of free movement and residence is sufficient 
relate to national legislation on surnames. See Grunkin-Paul v. Standesamt Niebüll, Case 
C-353/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-7639, ¶ 39; Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] 
E.C.R. I-11,613, ¶ 45. 
28. See Nerkowska, [2008] E.C.R. I-3993, ¶ 32. 
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Insurance case.29 This was a reference to the ECJ from the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, about Flemish legislation limiting a kind of 
social security benefit to those living and working in Flanders (a 
region of Belgium).30 In fact, the limitation flowed from Belgian 
constitutional law, which restricts the law-making powers of the 
Belgian regions to their respective territories.31 In response to a 
European Commission (“Commission”) complaint, the 
legislation had been amended to ensure that migrant workers, in 
particular those EU citizens working in Flanders but residing in 
another Member State, could also benefit from the care 
insurance.32 However, the question then arose whether the 
benefit should also be extended to EU citizens working in 
Flanders, but residing in the Walloon Region (the other main 
Belgian region).33 The ECJ confirmed that EU law required such 
extension, notwithstanding the Belgian constitutional 
arrangements.34 Moreover, those benefiting from the extension 
included not only nationals of other Member States, but also 
Belgian citizens who had previously exercised their European 
free movement rights.35 EU law protects all moving EU citizens.36 
The net result is that all those working in Flanders benefit from 
the care insurance, except Belgian citizens who do not reside in 
Flanders and who have never worked or resided in another 
Member State. EU citizens are better protected than Belgian 
citizens. The ECJ was asked whether this was justified, but stuck 
to the principle that purely internal situations are not within the 
scope of EU law.37 It did however point out that the 
interpretation of EU law could be relevant also to purely internal 
situations, 
in particular if the law of the Member State concerned were 
to require every national of that state to be allowed to enjoy 
the same rights as those which a national of another Member 
 
29. Government of the French Community v. Flemish Government (Care Ins.), 
Case C-212/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-1683. 
30. Id. ¶ 37. 
31. See DE BELGISCHE GRONDWET [Constitution] art. 35 (Belg.). 
32. Care Ins., [2008] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶¶ 37–52. 
33. Id. ¶¶ 46–60. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
37. Id. ¶¶ 38–40. 
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State would derive from Community law in a situation 
considered to be comparable by [the referring] court.38 
In other words, national principles of nondiscrimination 
and equal treatment could universalize the EU law solution, but 
this is considered a question of national, not EU law. Advocate 
General Sharpston went further. She found that there was 
something deeply paradoxical about the proposition that, 
although the last 50 years have been spent abolishing 
barriers to freedom of movement between Member States, 
decentralised authorities of Member States may nevertheless 
reintroduce barriers through the back door by establishing 
them within Member States.39  
She drew on case law regarding the EU customs union, according 
to which no customs duties and charges having equivalent effect 
can be imposed on trade between and within Member States. In 
that case law the ECJ refers to article 14(2) EC (article 26 
TFEU),40 which defines the internal market as “an area without 
internal frontiers,” and “draws no distinction between inter-State 
frontiers and frontiers within a single State.”41 The Advocate 
General argued that the case law on citizenship should move in a 
similar direction of not permitting internal borders which hinder 
rights of free movement and residence.42 
Even if the court did not follow the Advocate General’s 
reasoning, the case shows how principles of EU law have the 
potential of becoming more pervasive, and how they may 
interfere with domestic constitutional arrangements. 
II. EU LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE EFFECT OF 
KADI 
The autonomous nature of EU law is its very foundation. It 
all started in Van Gend en Loos, where the ECJ established that the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community had 
 
38. Id. ¶ 40. 
39. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Care Ins., [2007] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶ 116 
(emphasis added). 
40. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 26, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 59; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 14, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 48–49. 
41. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Care Ins., [2007] E.C.R. I-1683, ¶ 128. 
42. Id. ¶¶ 135–44. 
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created a new legal order.43 The norms of that legal order have a 
direct effect on the laws of the Member States, and prevail over 
any incompatible national laws. Those principles concerning the 
relationship between EU law and national law are firmly 
established. But what does the autonomy of EU law mean for its 
relationship with international law? That fundamental question 
was raised in Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council, a case putting in issue 
a U.N. Security Council resolution concerning 
counterterrorism.44 As is well known, the Security Council has 
broad powers under the United Nations Charter to maintain 
peace and international security.45 Moreover, the charter as a 
whole takes precedence, in case of conflict, over any other treaty 
obligations of U.N. members.46 
A. Autonomy of EU Law in Kadi 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al Barakaat International 
Foundation were listed in an EC regulation as associated to 
Usama bin Laden.47 The regulation froze all their assets.48 It was 
adopted to give effect to a common position adopted by the EU 
under the second pillar.49 The common position, in turn, 
implemented U.N. Security Council resolutions, which listed all 
known associates of Usama bin Laden, including Kadi and Al 
Barakaat.50 Kadi and Al Barakaat brought actions for annulment 
before the EU Court of First Instance (“CFI”) (now the General 
Court).51 That court turned down their applications on the 
ground that any review of the lawfulness of the regulation on the 
basis of general principles of EU law (fundamental rights, such as 
the right of defence, the right to effective judicial protection, and 
 
43. N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin. (Van Gend en Loos), Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1. 
44. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 299. 
45. Id. ¶¶ 293–94. 
46. U.N. Charter art. 103. 
47. See Council Regulation Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed 
Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated With Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida 
Network and the Taliban, No. 881/2002, annex 1, 2002 O.J. L 139/9, at 12. 
48. Id. art. 2(1), 2002 L 139/9, at 10. 
49. Id. pmbl., 2002 L 139/9, at 9. 
50. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 23. 
51. See Kadi v. Council, Case T-315/01, [2005] E.C.R. II-3649; Ali Yusuf v. Council 
(Al Barakaat), Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. II-3533. 
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the right to property) was precluded given the U.N. origin of the 
sanctions. Such review would constitute indirect review of a U.N. 
resolution, and the court considered that U.N. law had the effect 
of circumscribing the powers of the EU institutions.52 Only review 
on grounds of breach of peremptory norms of international law 
(ius cogens) was permissible.53 However, such review did not lead 
to a finding of illegality.54 
On the consolidated appeal, the ECJ overturned the CFI 
decision. It did not consider the U.N. origin of the sanctions to 
preclude review of the regulation on grounds of general 
principles of EU law, in particular, fundamental rights.55 It found 
that Mr. Kadi’s and Al Barakaat’s rights were indeed violated, and 
struck down the regulation.56 The court’s reasoning is extensive, 
but can be summarized as follows: 
 The EU is based on the rule of law, and that principle 
includes judicial review of all EU acts.57 
 An international agreement cannot affect the 
autonomy of EU law—which the court must uphold.58 
 All EU acts must respect fundamental rights, and 
international obligations cannot prejudice this 
constitutional principle.59 
 The judicial review in issue is limited to the EC 
regulation and does not affect the primacy of a U.N. 
resolution under international law.60 
 EU law respects international law, and this extends to 
observance of undertakings given in the context of the 
U.N.; the EU should take due account of the terms and 
objectives of U.N. resolutions.61 
 However, the U.N. Charter does not impose a 
particular model of transposition of U.N. resolutions, 
 
52. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 84. 
53. Id. ¶ 86. 
54. Id. ¶ 156. 
55. Id. ¶¶ 281–84, 290, 304–19. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 328, 372. 
57. Id. ¶ 281. 
58. Id. ¶ 282. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 283–85. 
60. Id. ¶¶ 286–89. 
61. Id. ¶¶ 291–97. 
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and leaves U.N. members a free choice among the 
various possible models.62 
 Immunity of jurisdiction finds no basis in the EU 
Treaties. Article 347 TFEU (article 297 EC)—EU 
Member States are allowed to give effect to 
international obligations concerning international 
peace and security63—and article 351 TFEU (article 307 
EC)—EU Member States are allowed to give effect to 
treaty obligations preceding their accession64—cannot 
be understood to authorize any derogation from the 
principles of liberty, democracy, and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which are a 
foundation of the EU.65 
 If U.N. Charter obligations were placed in the hierarchy 
of norms within the EU legal order, they would have 
primacy over EU legislation, but not over EU primary 
law, in particular fundamental rights.66 
 These findings are consistent with case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.67 
 The argument that the court should defer to the 
Security Council because the current U.N. 
reexamination procedure of terrorism listings offers 
adequate protection of fundamental rights is rejected: 
that procedure does not offer the guarantees of judicial 
protection.68 
The Court’s approach has been described as sharply 
dualist.69 The Court emphasizes the autonomy of the EU legal 
order. Judicial review in the light of fundamental rights is the 
expression of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EU 
treaties as an autonomous legal system, a guarantee which is not 
to be prejudiced by an international agreement. Not even the 
 
62. Id. ¶ 298. 
63. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 347, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 194; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 297, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 174. 
64. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 351, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 196; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 307, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 178. 
65. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 302–04. 
66. Id. ¶¶ 305–09. 
67. Id. ¶¶ 310–17. 
68. Id. ¶¶ 318–25. 
69. See Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal 
Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2010). 
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U.N. Charter is capable of interfering with that guarantee, 
notwithstanding the charter’s primacy under international law, a 
primacy which the court accepts. 
The strong confirmation of the autonomy of EU law is 
undeniable. But there is of course nothing new in that autonomy: 
since Van Gend en Loos, this is the very premise of the EU legal 
order.70 However, the notion of dualism is much less helpful for 
the purpose of characterizing the court’s reasoning. Generally 
speaking, the concepts of monism and dualism are outdated and 
inadequate for a proper reflection on the relationships between 
legal systems.71 Monism means that international law and 
municipal law are automatically integrated, with international law 
taking precedence.72 Dualism means that international law can 
only be effective when incorporated in municipal law, by means 
of some act of transformation.73 In Kadi, such acts of 
transformation had already been adopted when the court was 
asked to review: they are the EU common position, and the EC 
regulation listing Mr. Kadi and Al Barakaat, which the court 
annulled.74 The Security Council resolution was thus 
incorporated in the EU legal order, and it is the EU legislature 
that took a dualist approach. 
The interactions between international law and municipal 
law in today’s world have too many different dimensions for 
blunt and abstract concepts such as monism and dualism to be 
helpful. The Kadi judgment therefore needs to be put in 
perspective, for it discusses but one type of relationship between 
international law and EU law. In other judgments, the court 
displays considerable openness towards international norms. 
Most international agreements concluded by the EU are 
considered to have direct (self-executing) effect, and the court 
has been willing to apply norms of customary international law.75 
Even in Kadi, the court on a dispassionate reading simply 
 
70. See id. at 7. 
71. See Armin Von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the 
Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 
397, 399–400 (2008). 
72. See Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, International Law and 
Constitution-Making, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 467, 470 (2003). 
73. See id. 
74. See de Búrca, supra note 69, at 17–18. 
75. See PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN—LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 274–344 (2004). 
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confirms established rules and principles concerning: (a) judicial 
review; (b) the importance of fundamental rights; and (c) the 
relationship between international law and EU law.76 All acts of 
the institutions adopted under the EC Treaty (now the TFEU)77 
are subject to judicial review.78 All such acts need to comply with 
general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights.79 
When the EU acts under international law, for example by 
concluding an international agreement, the EC Treaty needs to 
be respected including all the judgments on external 
competence. The EU concludes that the norms of an 
international agreement need to be compatible with the EU 
treaties,80 as the TFEU itself clarifies in article 218(11) (article 
300 EC).81 The only point which the Kadi judgment adds is that 
those rules and principles extend to U.N. law, notwithstanding 
the primacy of the charter under international law, embodied in 
article 103 of the charter.82 
B. Article 103 in Kadi 
Most international law commentators are critical of the 
court’s silence on article 103 of the U.N. charter.83 The only 
reference which the court makes to that provision is an implicit 
one: 
any judgment given by the Community judicature deciding 
that a Community measure intended to give effect to such a 
resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in the 
 
76. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351. 
77. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 218(11), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 146; EC Treaty, supra 
note 11, art. 300, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 176–77. 
78. See Les Verts v. Parliament, Case C-294/83, [1986] E.C.R. 1339, ¶ 23. 
79. See, e.g., Opinion 2/94: Accession by the Cmty. to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶ 
34. 
80. See, e.g., Germany v. Council, Case C-122/95, [1998] E.C.R. I-973, ¶ 62. 
81. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 218, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 145–46; EC Treaty, supra note 
11, art. 300, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 176–77. 
82. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 10. 
83. See, e.g., Andrea Gattini, Annotation of Kadi and Al Barakaat, 46 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 213, 226 (2009). 
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Community legal order would not entail any challenge to the 
primacy of that resolution in international law.84  
There is no further analysis of the primacy rule. Nor is there 
analysis in the opinion of Advocate General Maduro.85 Is this not 
an approach which is too cursory, sweeping article 103 under the 
carpet, as it were? As a matter of positive law, the answer to that 
question is negative.86 It is difficult to see the relevance of article 
103 in the kind of proceedings leading to the judgment in Kadi. 
Article 103 addresses the obligations of the members of the 
United Nations under the charter (and the EU is not of course 
such a member), and provides that, in the event of a conflict with 
obligations under any other international agreement, the charter 
prevails.87 Article 103 therefore speaks to the obligations of the 
EU Member States, but not to those of the EU. International law 
is itself most serious about the autonomous nature of 
international organizations: see, for example, the International 
Law Commission’s work on the responsibility of international 
organizations.88 In the light of such autonomy, it is difficult to see 
what effect article 103 can have for the EU, as a matter of positive 
law. Moreover, in Kadi the courts were not looking at measures 
adopted by the EU Member States, which are of course bound by 
article 103. They were scrutinizing an EU measure, adopted 
under the EU treaties. It is the most basic principle of 
international law that a treaty needs to be respected. One cannot 
expect a court, such as the ECJ, which the EU treaties instruct to 
ensure that acts of the institutions are in conformity with those 
treaties,89 to disregard that instruction simply on the basis of a 
provision in another treaty which, on its terms, does not apply. 
Admittedly, it is not surprising that the CFI referred to 
article 103, and that prima facie the provision appears relevant in 
 
84. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 288. 
85. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-
6351, ¶¶ 18, 20. 
86. See generally Piet Eeckhout, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, 
and UN Security Council Resolutions—In Search of the Right Fit, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 183 
(2007). 
87. U.N. Charter art. 103. 
88. See generally U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission: 
56th Session (3 May - 4 June and 5 July - 6 August 2004), U.N. Doc. A/59/10 (2004). 
89. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 263, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 162–63; EC Treaty, supra note 
11, art. 230, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 146. 
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Kadi. If a case were to arise in, for example, the United States, 
about whether freezing measures implementing a U.N. 
resolution need to conform to the U.S. Constitution, the answer 
would be quite obvious: of course they need to be in conformity. 
Article 103 would be regarded as irrelevant because the U.S. 
Constitution is a constitution, not a treaty. The EU treaties are, 
again in positive law terms, treaties, not a constitution. However, 
in Kadi the Court of Justice undeniably adopts a constitutional 
perspective.90 The court uses the term “constitutional” in several 
paragraphs when referring to the kind of judicial review and 
respect for fundamental rights which the treaties mandate.91 The 
judgment is constitutional because it characterizes the EU 
treaties as containing constitutional norms that cannot be 
derogated.92 It is constitutional in its approach of allowing the 
penetration of international law only in compliance with the 
relevant rules and principles of EU law. Here is, in the court’s 
conception, a kind of municipal legal system, with its own 
constitution (notwithstanding the rejection by voters in some 
Member States); EU law is not a mere branch of international 
law.93 
C. Fundamental Rights in Kadi 
A last comment on Kadi and the relationship between EU 
law and international law concerns the actual review by the court 
in the light of fundamental rights. One commentator has said 
that the court “expressed important parts of its reasoning in 
chauvinist and parochial tones.”94 However, one cannot see what 
is chauvinist and parochial about the court applying fundamental 
rights norms which are shared between the twenty-seven Member 
States of the EU; norms which are largely derived from the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”),95 
 
90. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 4–5, 81. 
91. Id. ¶¶ 5, 81, 202, 281. 
92. Id. ¶ 202. 
93. Id. ¶ 316. 
94. de Búrca, supra note 69, at 3–4. 
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
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which has forty-seven contracting parties;96 norms, lastly, which 
are very similar to those which one finds in U.N. human rights 
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”).97 In fact, it might have been 
preferable for the court to have pointed out that the human 
rights norms which it was applying are by no means alien to the 
U.N. legal system. Such a statement is absent from the judgment, 
which is perhaps deplorable. But the point remains that the 
court applied norms which the U.N. itself promotes and seeks to 
enforce. 
The main lesson which international law needs to draw from 
the Kadi judgment is that, because international law increasingly 
affects the position of individuals in ever more direct ways, it 
needs to develop much better mechanisms for the protection of 
individual rights. If improved protection had been afforded in 
Kadi, the court would have been much more inclined to defer to 
the resolution. In fact, the court intimated that a kind of 
“Solange”98 approach towards international law is not excluded. 
It devoted eight paragraphs to the Commission’s argument that 
the U.N. sanctions system allows for the individuals or entities 
concerned to be heard.99 The court considered that the current 
reexamination procedure does not offer the guarantees of 
judicial protection.100 But it did expressly refer to the “so long as” 
terminology which the Commission put forward.101 There would 
have been no need to engage with the argument if no “Solange” 
approach were conceivable. If the Security Council puts its house 
in order, one would expect the Court of Justice to defer to the 
 
96. Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights: Some Facts and 
Figures 1998–2008, at 1 (2008). 
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
98. The “Solange” doctrine (German for “as long as”) is increasingly employed as 
a method for courts to accept and apply the norms of another legal system, as long as 
the fundamental norms of the court’s own system, in particular those concerning 
fundamental rights, are respected. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974 (Solange I), 37 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 271 (F.R.G.), translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; 
BverfG Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange II), 73 BverfGE 339 (F.R.G.), translated in [1987] 3 
C.M.L.R. 225  
99. Kadi v. Council (Kadi & Al Barakaat), Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, [2008] 
E.C.R. I-6351, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶¶ 319–26. 
100. Id. at ¶ 322. 
101. Id. at ¶ 319. 
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U.N. system of protection. But for now, the court’s position is 
akin to the first “Solange” judgment of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany:102 as long as the U.N. does not 
itself guarantee effective judicial protection, the court will 
enforce European human rights norms, as it does in all other 
circumstances. The court’s judgment should be seen as an 
incentive for the further development and improvement of 
international law, and not as a retreat from international law. 
III. BALANCING ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
In today’s globalized world, there is ever greater scope for 
tension between the economic freedoms of trade and 
investment, and the protection of human rights. At the 
international level, there is an extensive debate about this, 
particularly focused on the World Trade Organization.103 
However, that debate continues to be largely theoretical in the 
absence of disputes and rulings. The law of the EU’s economic 
freedoms is more mature than its international counterpart, and 
the EU’s internal market is more integrated than the world 
market. These may be some of the reasons why this tension has 
resulted in EU case law. There is now a considerable body of ECJ 
judgments grappling with how to balance economic freedoms 
and human rights; or in some cases, with how they may reinforce 
each other. Again, the ECJ is in a rather unique position. The EU 
legal system is quasi-federal, but it also needs to accept and 
accommodate the diversity which the non-unified European 
polity represents. Notwithstanding the common human rights 
standards emanating from the European Convention on Human 
Rights and assimilated into EU law, the Member States continue 
to harbour different concepts of human rights protection. One 
need only think of the debate about social rights, for example, 
the right to take collective action (“to strike”), which is strongly 
resisted in Member States such as the United Kingdom, and 
seems to be a near inalienable right in others. 
How does the ECJ approach these questions of balancing? 
Let us look at some of the leading cases. 
 
102. Solange I, 37 BverfGE 271 (F.R.G.), translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. 
103. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier et al. 
eds., 2005). 
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In Schmidberger104 the ECJ was asked to examine whether the 
Austrian authorization of a blockade of the Brenner Autobahn (a 
vital transit route from Germany to Italy) could be justified on 
grounds of freedom of expression and the right of assembly. 
Schmidberger, a transport company, had suffered damage as a 
result of the blockade, which was the work of Austrian citizens 
and groups protesting against the environmental degradation of 
the Alps, resulting from excessive road transport.105 The Austrian 
authorities had allowed the protests, and Schmidberger argued 
that this authorization was in breach of the free movement of 
goods, and claimed compensation for the damage caused.106 The 
ECJ decided that the human rights at issue could justify trade 
restrictions, and that in the circumstances of the case the 
restrictions were not disproportionate, and therefore had to be 
tolerated.107 This judgment clarified that respect for human 
rights can justify a trade restriction. Human rights, one could say, 
may trump free trade. However, the principle of proportionality 
fully applies. This means that at least those human rights which 
are not absolute in nature need to be balanced with safeguarding 
the economic freedoms guaranteed by the EU treaties. 
In this judgment, as in others concerning human rights, the 
ECJ applied common standards of EU human rights protection. 
It is in the very nature of human rights as “general principles of 
EU law” to be a shared set of principles which underpin the EU 
legal system. However, this common character of human rights in 
their EU law version does not remove the diversity that exists 
across the EU Member States. EU human rights are not a federal 
law standard which trumps all national law. 
An important judgment that illustrates this point is Omega 
Spielhallen.108 Omega ran a so-called laserdrome in Bonn with 
equipment supplied by a U.K. company under a franchising 
contract.109 The Bonn municipal authorities intervened, however, 
claiming that allowing people to “play at killing” each other 
 
104. Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria, 
Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659. 
105. Id. ¶ 16. 
106. Id. ¶ 20. 
107. Id. ¶¶ 74, 91. 
108. Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609. 
109. Id. ¶ 3. 
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constituted an affront to human dignity, which is a cardinal 
constitutional principle protected by article 1 of the German 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law).110 The case was referred to the ECJ, 
which first established that there was a restriction of the freedom 
to provide services, because of the involvement of the U.K. 
firm.111 It then analyzed whether the restriction could be justified 
on grounds of public policy under article 46 EC (article 52 
TFEU).112 The court noted that, although public policy may be 
relied upon only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious 
threat to a fundamental interest of society, the specific 
circumstances which may justify recourse to that concept may 
vary from one country to another and from one era to another.113 
A margin of discretion must therefore be allowed. The ECJ then 
described how the German authorities and courts considered 
that the simulated killing constituted a breach of the 
constitutional human dignity principle.114 It emphasized the 
importance of respect for human rights in EU law, and found 
that such respect undeniably encompassed respect for human 
dignity. Protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest 
which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the freedom to 
provide services.115 Then, importantly, the court clarified that 
“[i]t is not indispensable . . . for the restrictive measure . . . to 
correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as 
regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or 
legitimate interest in question is to be protected.”116 The need 
for, and proportionality of, the provisions adopted are not 
excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a system 
of protection different from that adopted by another Member 
State. The court finally noted that the prohibition at issue 
corresponded to the level of protection of human dignity which 
the German Grundgesetz sought to guarantee; the prohibition, by 
 
110. Id. ¶ 11. 
111. Id. ¶ 25. 
112. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 52, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 69; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 46, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 61. 
113. Omega Spielhallen, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, ¶ 31. 
114. Id. ¶ 32. 
115. Id. ¶ 35. 
116. Id. ¶ 37. 
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being restricted to the “play at killing” variant of the laser game, 
did not go beyond what was necessary.117 
The judgment adds a further layer to the balancing of 
human rights and economic freedoms. In its earlier case law, the 
ECJ had always emphasized that justifications that a Member 
State invokes for restricting the treaty’s freedoms have to comply 
with the EU law version of human rights (as general principles of 
EU law).118 Schmidberger then showed that protection of human 
rights could itself constitute such a justification. Omega Spielhallen 
goes one step further by allowing diversity in how the Member 
States apply their human rights law, as long as the human right at 
issue is recognized by EU law. This is reminiscent of the “margin 
of appreciation” which the Convention also permits. It is not 
wholly clear, however, in which cases the court would allow such 
diversity, or when it would insist on respect for a common, 
shared standard, which it would itself determine. 
More recently, the court has been confronted with even 
more sensitive cases, which expose the tension—also at a political 
level—between the protection of social rights and the EU’s free 
market principles. The cases are linked to the 2004 expansion of 
the EU, which enabled Central and East European countries to 
fully benefit from the EU internal market, but also led to fears of 
“social dumping” and protectionist policies in the “old” Member 
States. The clearest case is Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking 
Line ABP.119 Viking Line is a Finnish ferry operator which had 
decided to reflag one of its vessels, the Rosella, by registering it in 
Estonia or Norway.120 The reason for this was that the company 
suffered from Estonian competition, and sought to enter into a 
new collective agreement with a trade union in one of those 
states, so that it could reduce wages.121 Both the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union (“FSU”) and the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (“ITF”) objected to this reflagging and took 
action against it (the ITF, for example, issued a circular to its 
 
117. Id. ¶ 39. 
118. See Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, Case C-
260/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2925, ¶¶ 42–44. 
119. Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-10,779; Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-
341/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-11,767. 
120. Viking Line, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779, ¶¶ 6, 9. 
121. Id. ¶ 9. 
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affiliate trade unions asking them to refrain from entering into 
negotiations with Viking).122 Viking then brought proceedings 
against ITF and FSU in the United Kingdom, arguing that their 
actions were in breach of the right of establishment (article 43 
EC (article 49 TFEU)),123 and the case was referred to the ECJ.124 
The ECJ first established that the collective action 
undertaken by the trade unions fell within the scope of article 43 
EC.125 This concerns the horizontal effect of that provision. It 
binds not only public authorities, but also applies where working 
conditions are governed by collective agreements, and therefore 
extends to action by trade unions. The court agreed that the 
right to take collective action, including the right to strike, is a 
human right which forms an integral part of the general 
principles of EU law.126 However, it did not accept that this took 
those rights outside the scope of the right of establishment.127 
The court subsequently established that there was a restriction of 
the right of establishment: the collective actions by FSU and ITF 
had the effect of making less attractive, or even pointless, 
Viking’s exercise of its right of establishment.128 
The next question was whether the restriction was justified. 
The ECJ accepted that the right to take collective action for the 
protection of workers is a legitimate interest which, in principle, 
justifies a restriction.129 It referred to the fact that the EU pursues 
both economic and social aims, and therefore considered that 
the economic freedoms must be balanced against the objectives 
of social policy.130 In the case, the actual balancing 
(proportionality test) had to be done by the referring court.131 
But the ECJ did establish the parameters for that exercise.132 The 
main parameter is that the collective action could only be 
justified if the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were 
 
122. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
123. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 52, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 67; EC Treaty, supra note 11, 
art. 43, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 59. 
124. Viking Line, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779, ¶ 22. 
125. Id. ¶ 55. 
126. Id. ¶ 44. 
127. Id. ¶ 74. 
128. Id. ¶ 72. 
129. Id. ¶ 77. 
130. Id. ¶ 79. 
131. Id. ¶ 80. 
132. Id. ¶¶ 80–90. 
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jeopardized or under serious threat.133 Even if that was the case, 
the collective action had to be proportionate, meaning both 
suitable and necessary.134 
This line of case law illuminates the relationship between 
human rights and the EU’s economic freedoms in a number of 
ways. The priority of human rights is not unconditional, but 
subject to the principle of proportionality. That is not 
particularly remarkable. The human rights which the ECJ is 
asked to enforce or respect can all be restricted on public 
interest grounds.135 At an EU level, free trade and free movement 
constitute such a public interest. The Member States must, even 
when taking measures justified on human rights grounds, take 
into account the EU public interest embodied in the economic 
freedoms.136 Their measures must be proportionate to the 
human-rights aim pursued.137 
However, not all questions have been answered. The 
principle of proportionality is a flexible tool, which in itself does 
not determine how the balancing act is to be conducted. The ECJ 
has developed an extensive body of case law on proportionality, 
and it is fair to say that the concept is employed in all kinds of 
shapes and forms.138 The case law on human rights and economic 
freedoms does not as yet create a particular type of 
proportionality, adjusted to the specific issues that arise. Nor 
does it clarify to what extent the human rights norms relied upon 
are determined by EU law, or by national law. 
IV. PRIMACY 
The fourth theme which this Essay seeks to explore briefly is 
the primacy of EU law over national law. The reasons for this are 
twofold. 
First, the kind of primacy which EU law has managed to 
establish continues to be unique. The Author is not aware of any 
 
133. Id. ¶ 81. 
134. Id. ¶ 84. 
135. Steve Peers, Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations, in THE EUROPEAN 
UNION CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 141, 142–43 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward 
eds., 2004). 
136. Id. at 142–43, n.5. 
137. Id. 
138. TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 140 (2d ed. 2006). 
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other international or supranational legal system that: (a) is 
based on the principle that, in case of conflict with national or 
municipal law, the international/supranational norm prevails; 
and (b) makes that principle part of municipal law, both in 
theory and in practice. The unique character of the primacy 
principle continues to be a contested and sensitive issue, 
notwithstanding the fact that it was established as long ago as 
1964.139 This was witnessed when the ill-fated constitutional 
treaty140 attempted to codify this principle: that effort was seen by 
many as a bridge too far in the direction of building a European 
state.141 The codification was abandoned in the Treaty of Lisbon 
as one of the “constitutional symbols” that the negative referenda 
in the Netherlands and France had rejected.142 
Second, while the ECJ steadfastly confirms the absolute and 
unqualified character of the principle of primacy, national 
supreme and constitutional courts continue to emphasize that 
primacy has its basis in national constitutional norms, and is, 
therefore, not absolute and unqualified.143 The relevant national 
case law continues to evolve, whereas the ECJ’s case law is fixed 
and intransmutable, at least on the face of things. 
So what are some of the recent developments in the case law 
of national supreme and constitutional courts? Some courts are 
moving in the direction of greater acceptance of the special 
status of EU law. For example, subsequent to an important 
constitutional amendment which appeared to put EU law in the 
same category as other international obligations, the Italian 
Constitutional Court nevertheless confirmed the special status of 
EU law.144 The amendment could have been read as limiting EU 
 
139. See generally Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case C-
6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585. 
140. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. C 304/1. 
141. See, e.g., Stephen Charles Sieberson, How The Constitutional Treaty Identifies 
Dividing Lines, in DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER 
STATES—ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 59, 63, 75, 199 (2008). 
142. See Ingolf Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights, in THE LISBON 
TREATY: EU CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? 235, 239 (Stefan 
Griller & Jacques Ziller eds., 2008). 
143. See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267, 267–68 (1981) (calling this the dual nature of 
supranationalism). 
144. See L.S. Rossi, Annotation, Corte Costituzionale (Italian Constitutional Court): 
Decisions 348 and 349/2007 of 22 October 2007, and 102 and 103/2008, of 12 February 2008, 
46 COMMON .MKT. L. REV. 319, 319–20 (2009). 
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law primacy to a principle binding the Italian legislature, yet fully 
subordinating EU law to the Italian Constitution itself. The 
Constitutional Court, however, did not adopt such a reading. 
The court differentiates between EU law obligations, which have 
a constitutional status, and other international obligations 
(including those flowing from the Convention) whose role is 
subconstitutional.145 The court does, however, maintain the 
concept of “counter-limits” (controlimiti), according to which 
there continues to be review, at least in theory, of EU law 
compliance with fundamental constitutional norms.146 
Another example is the case law of the Belgian 
Constitutional Court, which not only accepts the primacy of EU 
law, but makes EU law part of its constitutionality review of 
Belgian federal and subfederal legislation.147 
There is, however, also more critical recent case law. A 
couple of years ago, several constitutional courts looked into the 
domestic implementation of the European Arrest Warrant 
(“EAW”), a so-called third pillar legislative instrument, which 
facilitates the “surrender,” instead of extradition, of criminal 
suspects between EU Member States.148 The Polish Constitutional 
Court simply established that the legislative implementation of 
the EAW was unconstitutional, because the Polish Constitution 
prohibits the extradition of Polish citizens.149 Effectively, it was 
confirming a conflict between the EAW itself, and the Polish 
Constitution. The Polish Constitutional Court did not accept the 
argument that Poland’s Constitution could be read in conformity 
with EU law.150 This somewhat confrontational approach is in 
 
145. See id. at 324. 
146. See Corte cost., 27 dec. 1973, n.183 (Frontini), Foro It. 314 (1974) (Italy), 
translated in [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372; see also Rossi, supra note 144 at 320. 
147. See Thomas Vandamme, Annotation, Case C-212/06, Government of the French 
Community and the Walloon Government v. Flemish Government, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Grand Chamber) of 1 April 2008, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 287, 294–95, 299–300 (2009). 
148. See Jan Komárek, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: In 
Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles,” 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2007) 
(providing an overview and analysis). 
149. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [TK] [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] Apr. 27, 
2005 (EAW Decision), No. P 1/05, 4 Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego Zbiór 
Urzędowy [Z.U.] [Official Collection of the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Tribunal] (ser. A) 42 (2005), ¶ 1.1. A full text English translation is available on the 
court’s website at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/summaries_assets/
documents/p_1_05_full_gb.pdf. 
150. See id. ¶ 5.4. 
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line with the accession treaty decision of the Polish 
Constitutional Court, in which it rejected, as a matter of 
principle, the primacy of EU law in cases of conflict with the 
Polish Constitution.151 On the other hand, in the EAW decision 
the court maintained the legal effects of the challenged 
legislation for eighteen months, allowing—indeed instructing—
the Polish constitutional legislator to remove the conflict with EU 
law.152 
The German Federal Constitutional Court (“FCC”) was 
equally critical of the domestic implementation of the EAW, 
regarding the terms under which it permitted the surrender of 
German citizens.153 A complete analysis of the judgment is 
outside the scope of this Essay, but the court expressed a measure 
of distrust of other Member States’ criminal justice systems, 
contrary to the basic premise of mutual recognition on which the 
EAW is based.154 It required the German legislature to provide 
for a case-by-case examination of requests for the extradition of 
German citizens, so as to ensure that the requesting authorities 
comply with the prerequisites of the rule of law.155 The FCC did 
not accept that article 6 TEU156 (now article 6 of Charter of 
 
151. See TK May 11, 2005, No. K 18/04, 5 Z.U. (ser. A) 49 (2005), ¶ 11. An English 
summary of the case is available on the court’s website at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/
eng/summaries/documents/k_18_04_gb.pdf. 
152. See EAW Decision, 4 Z.U. (ser. A) 42 (2005), ¶ 5.2. 
153. BVerfG July 18, 2005 (European Arrest Warrant Act Case), 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶ 
119 (F.R.G.), translated in [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. ¶ 78. 
156. Article 6 TEU pre-Lisbon provides: 
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which 
are common to the Member States.  
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
law. 
3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States. 
4. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its 
objectives and carry through its policies. 
TEU pre-Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 6, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 12. 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union)157 and preamble 
paragraph 8 TFEU158 offers sufficient guarantees.159 It stated that  
[t]he mere existence of this provision . . . and the existence 
of an all-European standard of human rights protection 
established by the [Convention] do not, however, justify the 
assumption that the rule-of-law structures are synchronized 
between the Member States of the European Union as 
regards substantive law and that a corresponding 
examination at the national level on a case-by-case basis is 
therefore superfluous. In this respect, putting into effect a 
strict principle of mutual recognition, and the extensive 
statement of mutual confidence among the states that is 
connected with it, cannot restrict the constitutional 
guarantee of the fundamental rights.160 
The FCC also made critical statements regarding the 
concept of EU citizenship, and its interpretation.161 Effectively, 
the court said that the rights of EU citizenship and the 
corresponding principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of 
nationality need to be limited in scope, or else they might 
fundamentally undermine the legal system of the German 
Constitution by leading to a loss of the core elements of 
statehood.162 In the same passage, the court confirmed that the 
EU respects national identities, which find their expression in 
their respective fundamental political and constitutional 
structures.163 It further pointed out that the core elements of 
German statehood are beyond constitutional amendment.164 
This reasoning was disputed in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Lübbe-Wolff. She criticized the majority for considering 
that the scope of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds 
 
157. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 6, 2007 O.J. C 
303/1, at 4 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.”) 
158. TFEU, supra note 11, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 52–53. TFEU Preamble 
Paragraph 8 provides: “[Member States] Resolved by thus pooling their resources to 
preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of 
Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts.” TFEU, supra note 11, 2008 O.J. C 
115, at 49. 
159. BverfG July 18, 2005 (European Arrest Warrant Act Case), 58 BVerfGE 2289, ¶ 
119 (F.R.G.), translated in [2006] 1 C.M.L.R. 16. 
160. Id. 
161. See supra Part I. 
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of nationality in article 12 EC (article 18 TFEU) was relevant to 
the issues at hand.165 She continued: 
Moreover, the information that following the principle of 
conferral, the ban on discrimination only applies to specific 
objectives set out in the Treaty deviates, in a manner that is 
hard to understand, from the wording of Article 12.1 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, which 
requires interpretation. Federal Constitutional Court 
judgments should not be used to send dark signals, which 
have no connection to the case at hand, to the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, which recently 
applied this provision somewhat extensively.166 
The French Conseil d’État also had the opportunity, recently, 
to consider the constitutionality of the implementation of an EU 
directive. The Arcelor case involved a challenge to a French 
decree giving effect to the directive establishing a greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme,167 in so far as the decree 
extended to the steel sector. The challenge was in effect an 
indirect challenge to the conformity, with the French 
Constitution, of the directive itself.168 The Conseil d’État pointed 
out that the acceptance by the authors of the Constitution of the 
participation of the French Republic in the making of Europe 
created a constitutional obligation to transpose directives, which 
could not in principle be obstructed.169 The administrative judge, 
when faced with a claim of breach of a provision or principle of 
constitutional value, has to examine whether EU law offers a rule 
or a general principle which, through its application, guarantees 
the effectiveness of the constitutional provision or principle 
relied upon.170 In the case at hand, the claimant referred to the 
right to property, the freedom of business, and the principle of 
 
165. Id. ¶ 160 (Lübbe-Wolff, J., dissenting). 
166. Id.; see also Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills (Bidar), [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, (concerning the right to 
nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, applied to student loans). 
167. See Conseil d’État [CE] [highest administrative court], Feb. 8, 2007 (Arcelor), 
CE Ass. Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon. 56, translated at [2007] 2 C.M.L.R. 28; see also Société 
Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine v. Premier Ministre, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, 
¶ 7. 
168. Arcelor, CE Ass. Feb. 8, 2007, Rec. Lebon. 56, ¶ 3. 
169. Id. ¶ 4. 
170. Id. 
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equality, all recognized in EU law.171 Where the administrative 
judge establishes that there are corresponding rules or principles 
of EU law, the judicial inquiry should turn to whether the 
directive complies with these rules or principles, and in case of 
serious doubt, a reference to the ECJ must be made.172 On the 
other hand, where there is no corresponding rule or principle of 
EU law, the judge needs to directly examine the constitutionality 
of the implementing decree.173 In other words, the Conseil d’État 
reserves the right to intervene, and to apply the French 
Constitution, where the relevant constitutional rules or principles 
have no counterpart in EU law. 
In Arcelor, the Conseil d’État made a reference to the ECJ, 
asking whether the directive was in breach of the principle of 
equal treatment by including the steel sector, and by not 
including other, competing sectors (plastic and aluminium).174 
The ECJ found that there was no breach, and did not in its 
judgment refer to the constitutionality test which the Conseil 
d’État employed.175 Advocate General Maduro, however, 
discussed this, and eloquently argued that the concurrent claims 
to legal sovereignty, the protection of the national constitution, 
and respect for EU law primacy could be reconciled.176 The EU 
and the national legal orders, he pointed out, are founded on 
the same fundamental legal values.177 Article 6 TEU expresses the 
respect due to national constitutional values, and indicates how 
best to prevent any real conflict with them, by anchoring the 
constitutional foundations of the EU in the constitutional 
principles common to the Member States.178 The Member States 
are thus reassured that EU law will not threaten the fundamental 
values of their constitutions. But they need to recognize that the 
task of reviewing EU acts in the light of those values is transferred 
to the Court of Justice, and cannot be done on the basis of 





174. Arcelor, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶¶ 5–21. 
175. Id. ¶ 73. 




1518 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1490 
uniformity which would undermine the idea that the EU is based 
on the rule of law: 
In other words, the effect of being able to rely on national 
constitutions to require the selective and discriminatory 
application of Community provisions in the territory of the 
Union would, paradoxically, be to distort the conformity of 
the Community legal order with the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States.179 
The primacy of EU law is therefore a primordial requirement of 
the EU legal order. All of this does not mean that the national 
constitutional courts have no role to play in the interpretation of 
EU general principles and fundamental rights: 
On the contrary, it is inherent in the very nature of the 
constitutional values of the Union as constitutional values 
common to the Member States that they must be refined and 
developed by the court in a process of ongoing dialogue with 
the national courts, in particular those responsible for 
determining the authentic interpretation of the national 
constitutions. The appropriate instrument of that dialogue is 
the reference for a preliminary ruling and it is in that 
context that the question raised here must be understood.180 
CONCLUSION 
Advocate General Maduro refers to the concept of legal 
pluralism as a broad denominator for the relationship between 
EU law and national law.181 Indeed, in European academic 
literature, legal or constitutional pluralism has become the 
predominant concept, or even theory, for the study of the 
relationships between different legal systems.182 It has not, 
however, managed to resolve all issues. Advocate General 
Maduro rightly emphasizes that EU law is fundamentally based 
on the constitutions and constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, and that it offers full guarantees of respect for a European 
 
179. Id. ¶ 16. 
180. Id. ¶ 17. 
181. Id. ¶ 15. 
182. See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE & 
NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 123–36 (1999); Miguel Pioares Maduro, 
Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in SOVEREIGNTY IN 
TRANSITION 501, 501–37 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 317–59 (2002). 
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constitutional common law. The Kadi judgment, discussed above, 
confirms that the Court of Justice takes very seriously its task of 
ensuring respect for fundamental rights.183 Indeed, if one reads 
the judgment from this European common law perspective, and 
against the backdrop of the court’s relationship with national 
constitutional courts, the need for intervention in the U.N. 
system of listing individuals stands out even more. Whether the 
idea of pluralism is sufficient for explaining the level of 
integration between EU law and national law is perhaps doubtful. 
There is more to the relationship between EU law and national 
law than a mere mutual respect for constitutional identity. This 
concept of respect is adequate as an indicator and instruction for 
how EU law approaches national constitutional identity. Omega 
Spielhallen, analyzed above,184 constitutes one of the best 
applications of this concept. The court is willing to accept that 
the German constitutional principle of human dignity leads to an 
interpretation and application of the EU law public policy 
exception specific to Germany, and not necessarily shared by 
other Member States.185 However, when the reverse question 
arises, namely to what extent national law needs to respect EU 
law, the answer is not simply respect for the EU’s constitutional 
identity. The answer is that all of EU law prevails over all national 
law, all of the time. Omega Spielhallen shows that EU law has room 
for diversity, but that room depends on chapter and verse of the 
specific EU law provisions in issue.186 
In so far as the concept of pluralism suggests that EU law 
and national law are autonomous, perhaps even self-contained 
legal systems, it is not an appropriate expression of their 
relationship. The degree of integration is such that any 
autonomy is seriously curtailed. This is not limited to the 
developing constitutional common law. The very mechanisms of 
implementation and application of EU law make it very difficult 
to draw boundaries between EU law and national law. The EU’s 
main legislative instrument, the directive, is the clearest 
exponent of the level of legal integration. All directives need to 
be transposed in national law and Member States need to achieve 
 
183. See supra Part II. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 102–11. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 112–13. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 112–13. 
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the prescribed results, but are free to decide about form and 
methods. Anyone who has been faced with interpretative 
questions about directives and their national implementation 
realizes the difficulty of drawing boundaries. Moreover, at a 
jurisdictional level, the preliminary rulings procedure embodies 
the level of integration, by ensuring a constant, wide-ranging, 
and deep cooperation between the Court of Justice and national 
courts. 
What about the reservations against absolute EU law 
primacy that national supreme and constitutional courts 
continue to harbor? Commentators assume too readily that there 
is a fundamental conflict between national constitutional case law 
and ECJ case law. The absolute and unconditional character of 
the primacy principle, as established by the ECJ, is quite simply 
determined by the limited jurisdiction of the court. It can only 
interpret the basic treaties, and has absolutely no interpretative 
authority over national constitutions.187 In one sense, the court is 
merely behaving like an international court when emphasizing 
primacy: domestic law is never an excuse for non-performance of 
international obligations.188 Of course, the fundamental 
difference with international law is that the court has ruled that 
this rule of primacy must be respected within national law.189 But 
the domestic constitutional basis for this is outside the court’s 
jurisdiction. National constitutional courts, on the other hand, 
are only acting within their jurisdiction when analyzing the 
constitutional basis for giving effect to EU law. Where they state 
that there may be limits to EU law primacy, there is as such no 
conflict. Conflict only arises where domestic courts decide, in a 
 
187. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
188. See id.; see also Mattias Kumm & Victoria Ferreres Comella, The Primacy Clause 
of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union, 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 473, 473 (2005). 
It is firmly established that a state when charged with a breach of its 
international obligations cannot in international law validly plead as a defense 
that it was unable to fulfil them because its internal law . . . contained in rules 
in conflict with international law; this applies equally to a state’s assertion of its 
inability to secure the necessary changes in its law by virtue of some legal or 
constitutional requirement. 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 84–85. (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
189. See Kumm & Comella, supra note 188, at 473. 
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specific case, not to apply EU law, for example, by declaring it 
unconstitutional. 
However, the absolute and unconditional character of the 
primacy principle can only be reconciled with national 
constitutional law as long as the scope and reach of EU law are 
themselves limited. This is probably the most important 
constitutional EU law principle. It is not restricted to an 
appropriate interpretation of the principle of conferred powers. 
The overall scope of the EU treaties is subject to constitutional 
limitations. The case law on EU citizenship, analyzed above, and 
criticized by the German Constitutional Court, is an example of 
how substantive interpretations of treaty provisions are also 
relevant to the question of drawing the boundaries of the EU 
legal order. 
Lastly, Advocate General Maduro correctly emphasizes that 
primacy is, in practice, not a one-way street, but is subject to a 
fundamental constitutional dialogue between national courts and 
the ECJ.190 In that respect it is noteworthy that we are entering a 
new phase: at least some constitutional courts have started to 
refer certain cases to the ECJ. This is a most welcome 
development. Too much dialogue has been conducted by means 
of the “dark signals” to which Judge Lübbe-Wolff referred.191 It 
would be much preferable, also for constitutional courts, to 
develop a more direct and open dialogue by means of referring 
cases to the ECJ. Such references should not be limited to 
mailing a couple of questions of EU law. Supreme and 
constitutional courts should take the opportunity to clarify their 
own thinking about the issues to which the case gives rise, 
including the issues of EU law. A good example is a recent 
reference by the U.K. House of Lords (now the Supreme Court 




190. Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine 
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191. See Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for Education and 
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